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Abstract
Background: Antitrust authorities treat price as a proxy for hospital quality since health care
quality is difficult to observe. As the ability to measure quality improved, more research became
necessary to investigate the relationship between hospital market power and patient outcomes.
This paper examines the impact of hospital competition on the quality of care as measured by the
risk-adjusted mortality rates with the hospital as the unit of analysis. The study separately examines
the effect of competition on non-profit hospitals.
Methods: We use California Office of Statewide Health Planning and Development (OSHPD) data
from 1997 through 2002. Empirical model is a cross-sectional study of 373 hospitals. Regression
analysis is used to estimate the relationship between Coronary Artery Bypass Graft (CABG) risk-
adjusted mortality rates and hospital competition.
Results: Regression results show lower risk-adjusted mortality rates in the presence of a more
competitive environment. This result holds for all alternative hospital market definitions. Non-
profit hospitals do not have better patient outcomes than investor-owned hospitals. However, they
tend to provide better quality in less competitive environments. CABG volume did not have a
significant effect on patient outcomes.
Conclusion: Quality should be incorporated into the antitrust analysis. When mergers lead to
higher prices and lower quality, thus lower social welfare, the antitrust challenge of hospital
mergers is warranted. The impact of lower hospital competition on quality of care delivered by
non-profit hospitals is ambiguous.
Background
Economic theory suggests that competition leads to effi-
cient outcomes. The health industry, however, is domi-
nated by non-profits that have different objectives than
the for-profit agents. Therefore, in health care markets, the
impact of competition on pricing and social welfare in
general is uncertain. To improve social welfare, antitrust
litigation ensuring that health care markets are competi-
tive should result not only in lower prices and costs but in
higher health care quality as well. Very little evidence is
currently available on the correlation between hospital
pricing and quality and the effect that hospital competi-
tion has on the many dimensions of health care quality.
While numerous studies examine the impact of hospital
competition on hospital prices and costs, the impact of
competition on hospital quality has received little atten-
tion and the available empirical evidence is ambiguous
[1-4].
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as a proxy for quality and consumer welfare, in part
because health care quality is difficult to observe.
Recently, however, the ability to measure quality has
improved greatly. Hence, it is becoming more widely
available in an effort to help consumers and purchasers
make the informed choices. From beta-blocker utilization
to risk-adjusted mortality rates researchers are using a
wide variety of measures to assess and rank health care
providers [5]. Therefore, the examination of the relation-
ship between competition and quality of health care serv-
ices has become an important research topic as well as a
public policy issue [6]. Cuellar and Gertler (2003) suggest
that higher post-merger hospital prices may reflect higher
quality [7]. However, this claim is not supported by
empirical evidence. Although mergers do lead to higher
prices and expenditures there is mounting empirical evi-
dence that expanded hospital competition does not
improve all dimensions of hospital quality [3,4,8]. Short-
ell and Hughes (1988), for example, find no significant
association between hospital competition and inpatient
mortality rates [9]. This result may be due to the time
period the study was conducted. Kessler and McClellan
(2000) found that competition significantly reduces costs
as well as adverse health outcomes, especially for the time
period after 1990 [10]. Before 1991 the study found that
competition led to higher costs and higher quality of care.
Ho and Hamilton (2000) compared the quality of hospi-
tal care before and after mergers in California between
1992 and 1995 [11]. They found no evidence that mergers
and acquisitions measurably affected inpatient mortality.
However, they did find that hospital consolidations are
associated with increased readmission rates for heart
attack patients in some cases and increased likelihood of
early discharge for normal newborns. Mukamel et al.
(2001) found no significant association between hospital
competition and risk-adjusted hospital mortality rates
[12]. Sari (2002) showed that both higher hospital market
share and market concentration are associated with lower
quality of care as measured by the in-hospital complica-
tions [13]. Similarly, Rivers and Fottler (2004) found that
more competitive markets have lower risk-adjusted mor-
tality rates [14]. Therefore, previous empirical findings
indicate that quality should be incorporated into antitrust
analysis. If mergers are indeed shown to lead to higher
prices and lower quality (or no quality improvements at
all), thus lowering social welfare taken as a whole, the case
to challenge hospital mergers is significantly strengthened
[13].
Importance of the study
This study examines the relationship between hospital
competition and hospital quality along one dimension:
risk adjusted mortality rates following Coronary Artery
Bypass Graft (CABG). Analyses of how hospital competi-
tion affects quality measures for heart disease are of spe-
cial importance since one-sixth of total hospital
expenditures are devoted to treatment of heart disease and
because such analyses may generalize to other acute ill-
nesses [10,15]. In California, over 120 non-federal hospi-
tals offer bypass surgery to about 27,000 adult patients
each year over the time period studied, 1997–2002 [16].
In addition, the impact of competition on CABG surgery
is of special interest because CABG is rarely performed in
emergency settings. Thus, hospitals may be relatively
more interested in improving CABG care in response to
competition as opposed t procedures that require imme-
diate admission and allow for little hospital choice such
Acute Mycardial Infraction (AMI) care. However, there is
also an opportunity for hospital selection by patients
although the impact of public reporting of risk-adjusted
mortality rates on hospitals' market share is uncertain
[17,18]. Such non-random hospital selection may pose
econometric problems and lead to biased coefficients.
CABG is one of the most frequently performed and costly
surgeries. It is also considered a very safe surgery and is
associated with quite low death rates (about 2.8% of all
patients) [16]. However, the total number of CABG sur-
geries performed has been declining over time as balloon
angioplasty and drug-coated stents have replaced it in
many less complicated cases. Although mortality data in
California is in line with national levels, the majority of
California hospitals perform fewer bypass surgeries each
year than is recommended for best outcomes by the Amer-
ican College of Cardiology and American Heart Associa-
tion [19]. In contrast, New York hospitals perform a
higher volume of surgeries and report lower mortality
rates. Thus, the impact of hospital volume on quality is of
special policy interest in states like California. Although
some previous studies suggest an inverse relationship
between hospital volume and mortality [20,21], this
result has been challenged in more recent work [22-24].
Contribution of this study to previous research
This study contributes to the existing body of literature
along several dimensions. First, we focus on risk-adjusted
mortality rates following CABG surgery, a procedure that
has not been closely examined. Second, we use alternative
measures of hospital market to measure the extent of hos-
pital competition. Third, this study closely examines the
quality outcomes of non-profit hospitals in some more
monopolistic markets, a topic that caused much contro-
versy among researchers. Lastly, the study attempts to
examine the relationship between hospital-specific CABG
mortality rates and CABG volume.Page 2 of 8
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Data sources
The study includes 373 hospitals that performed at least
two CABG surgeries over the period 1997–2002. Hospital
data have been obtained from the Hospital Annual Finan-
cial Disclosure Reports filed annually by all California
hospitals with the Office of Statewide Health Planning
and Development (OSHPD). Risk adjusted mortality rates
are based on the California Coronary Artery Bypass Graft
(CABG) Mortality Reporting Program (CCMRP). The hos-
pital-level data represents more than 70% of all CABG sur-
geries performed in California. Data submitted by each
hospital was reviewed for completeness and errors by
OSHPD via an independent medical records audit per-
formed for some years on selected hospitals.
Managed care enrollment estimates were based on man-
aged care enrollment data provided by Cattaneo and
Stroud Inc. study funded by the California Health Care
Foundation. Managed care customers in managed care
commercial, Medi-Care, Medi-Cal and Healthy Families
programs.
The source for the year- and county-specific income per
capita was the U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of
Economic Analysis.
Empirical model
In this study we used the risk-adjusted mortality measures
developed by OSHPD. Risk-adjusted mortality rates have
been widely used as indicators of health care quality since
they capture systematic differences in quality across hos-
pitals and account for patient risk factors that are beyond
a hospital's control. Failing to adjust for patient risk fac-
tors may give rise to omitted variable bias and result in
incorrect results concerning the relationship between hos-
pital competition and hospital quality. The unobservable
severity of illness is especially important for CABG where
hospital choice is not always limited by the urgency of
care. A logistic regression risk model was used to adjust for
patient characteristics: age, gender, body mass index, acu-
ity (elective, urgent, emergent or salvage) and secondary
conditions (such as hypertension, diabetes, etc.). Excess
mortality is defined as the difference between the
observed mortality rate and the predicted rate.
Let qht denote the quality measure, excess mortality, for
hospital h in year t. Our empirical model can be written
as:
qht = αMarketht + βInstitutionalht + δ(Ownership*HHI) +γEnvironmentalht + ζ(Public Insurance*HHI) + λTime +μh + εht,
where the market characteristics include both the hospital
competition index and managed care penetration. Hospi-
tal competition was measured by the Herfindahl-Hir-
schman Index (HHI), defined as the sum of squared
market shares of all hospitals competing in the same mar-
ket. We define a hospital market as the health service area
(HSA) specified by the National Center for Health Statis-
tics [15,25]. This definition uses an algorithm that mini-
mizes the travel distance to hospitals. Thus, unlike
counties or Metropolitan Statistical Areas (MSAs), HSAs
rely on patient flows rather than geo-political boundaries
to define hospital markets. There are 14 HSAs in Califor-
nia. The HHI index was constructed for each HSA and
year. Since hospital competition measures based on actual
flows of patients may be endogenous, in our sensitivity
analysis we use an alternative definition based on county
geographic boundaries. There are two important market
definitions in hospital merger cases, geographic market
and product market (CABG market in our case). First, we
estimate HHI for all hospitals in the market based on
staffed beds. Such measure will capture general hospital
competition that may spillover into the CABG market.
Additional analyses were conducted in which we defined
the market share based only on admissions for CABG sur-
gery. Thus we present results separately for the hospital
and CABG markets.
Besides hospital competition, market characteristics in (1)
include HMO (health maintenance organization) pene-
tration. It is defined as a number of people enrolled in
managed care divided by the total population. The data
was obtained on HMO penetration for each county and
year in the sample.
The vector of institutional characteristics in Equation (1)
includes hospital ownership types, system affiliation,
teaching status, and hospital size (number of staffed
beds). Ownership indicator variables included non-profit,
district and county ownership. The omitted category was
investor-owned ownership. Since non-profits may
respond to changes in competitive environment differ-
ently than for-profits [2], we include interaction variables
between hospital ownership and competition measure.
Teaching hospitals were defined as hospitals with some
residents. The institutional variables also contain interac-
tions between ownership status and HHI, since non-prof-
its can respond differently than for-profits to competitive
pressures. Given that changes in the outcomes may repre-
sent a volume effect, the number of patients admitted for
CABG surgery in the hospital during the year is also
included.
Environmental characteristics in (1) include per capita
personal income and percent of Medicare and Medi-Cal
(California Medicaid program) patients. These variablesPage 3 of 8
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care coverage across hospitals. Public insurance data is
hospital-specific and is reported by OSHPD. Gaynor and
Vogt (2003) suggest that competition should have a
higher effect on quality when the prices are fixed – for
example for Medicare and Medi-Cal patients – than when
the prices are variable [26]. Thus, as hospitals gain market
power (as their HHI goes up), the quality of care may fall
due to competition for patients whose payers pay fixed,
non-negotiable fees. We test this hypothesis by adding
interaction variables between HHI and hospital Medicare
and Medi-Cal penetration variables.
The vector of time variables in (1) includes year dummies
to control for the time trend. Finally, we include hospital-
specific fixed effects (μh) to account for time-invariant dif-
ferences. Since fixed effects capture all characteristics that
do not change over the sample period (e.g. county owner-
ship), we present our results both with and without the
fixed effects.
Results
Descriptive summary
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of market character-
istics for each of the 14 HSAs. Also, we include mean
CABG volume to better illustrate the size of each market.
The average number of hospitals performing CABG in
each market varies from 1 hospital to 19 per year. There-
fore, hospital competition varied significantly from very
competitive HHI of 0.095 to monopoly in the CABG mar-
ket (i.e. HHI of 1). Although each HSA includes several
contiguous counties, there is a lot of variation across mar-
kets. For example, mean HMO penetration varies from
12.9% to over 70%. Similarly, mean CABG volume varies
from 134.4 to 410.53 procedures.
Table 2 displays mean values, standard deviations and
minimum and maximum values for all non-interaction
variables included in the analysis. The mean market HHI
– around 0.0554 – suggests that hospital markets are very
competitive (markets with HHI below 0.18 are considered
moderately or very competitive) [27]. However, the mean
HHI based on CABG volume is 0.29, with a mean range
between 0.095 and 1 for some markets. This suggests that
there is large variation in HHI across CABG markets. Many
hospitals were located in a competitive environment, with
42.6% of hospitals in markets with a HHI below 0.18.
Excess mortality averaged above zero at 0.213 with 49.6%
of hospitals performing above zero, i.e., having observed
mortality above expected.
Regression results
Table 3 and Table 4 present multivariate regression
results. The results indicate that hospital competition neg-
atively affects excess mortality. Thus, as markets become
more monopolized (as HHI approaches 1) quality of care
as measured by a risk-adjusted mortality decreases. This
result holds for both measures of hospital market, with
and without hospital-specific fixed effects. Marginal
effects of HHI not reported in Table 3 are 25.32 and 2.87
for the two market definitions; both effects are statistically
significant. Non-profit hospitals are no different in quality
than the investor-owned hospitals. However, in more
concentrated markets non-profit hospitals tend to provide
higher quality of care relative to for-profits.
Estimates of the effects of Medicare and Medi-Cal case
loads yielded interesting results. The presence of higher
Medi-Cal case load in a given hospital leads on average to
a significantly lower quality. In more concentrated mar-
kets, however, such hospitals are seen to provide higher
Table 1: Health Service Area (HSA) characteristics, 1997–2002
HSA Mean hospitals 
per year
Minimum 
hospitals per 
year
Maximum 
hospitals per 
year
Mean market HHI 
(st. deviation)
Mean CABG HHI 
(st. deviation)
Mean CABG 
volume (st. 
deviation)
Mean HMO 
penetration (st. 
deviation)
1 1.83 1 2 0.0507 (0.00489) 0.645 (0.134) 387.91 (217.86) 0.129 (0.0330)
2 3.17 2 4 0.084 (0.00128) 0.545 (0.0907) 410.53 (381.62) 0.705 (0.0116)
3 1.67 1 2 0.114 (0.00843) 0.610 (0.206) 203.6 (47.77) 0.592 (0.0490)
4 6.83 5 8 0.0888 (0.00519) 0.278 (0.0652) 273.98 (279.93) 0.558 (0.0473)
5 4.67 4 6 0.0704 (0.00612) 0.316 (0.0752) 187.61 (169.61) 0.649 (0.0185)
6 3.17 3 4 0.0777 (0.00458) 0.379 (0.0509) 278.52 (130.44) 0.530 (0.0537)
7 1.67 1 3 0.124 (0.0258) 0.675 (0.252) 134.4 (95.08) 0.591 (0.0205)
8 1.83 1 2 0.123 (0.0157) 0.601 (0.136) 197.36 (89.0) 0.271 (0.0127)
9 1.0 1 1 0.0643 (0.0107) 1 (0) 340.33 (52.92) 0.230 (0.0759)
10 2.0 1 3 0.0855 (0.00475) 0.536 (0.227) 196.83 (77.93) 0.419 (0.0211)
11 19.17 17 25 0.0155 (0.00107) 0.095 (0.0305) 208.06 (206.86) 0.485 (0.0403)
12 2.0 1 3 0.0498 (0.00273) 0.386 (0.0797) 282.33 (178.66) 0.540 (0.0328)
13 5.83 1 9 0.0434 (0.00655) 0.187 (0.144) 204.37 (67.38) 0.532 (0.0532)
14 6.33 4 8 0.0551 (0.00179) 0.178 (0.0413) 277.68 (84.74) 0.514 (0.0309)Page 4 of 8
(page number not for citation purposes)
BMC Health Services Research 2008, 8:89 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/8/89quality. Thus, safety-net hospitals with a large volume of
Medi-Cal patients may not cut on quality in the presence
of low competition relative to other health care providers.
Hospitals with a higher Medicare load have, on average,
higher quality. However, in the more concentrated mar-
kets such hospitals tend to have worse outcomes, as
hypothesized by Gaynor and Vogt (2003) but the esti-
mates are not statistically significant after we adjusted for
fixed effects [26]. Alternative explanations of these results
include profit margins for CABG for Medicare and Medi-
Cal patients. More research is necessary to examine the
effect of Medicare and Medicaid penetration on hospital
risk-adjusted mortality rates and other measures of qual-
ity.
The multivariate regression results in Tables 2 and 3 show
that hospitals that perform a higher volume of CABG pro-
cedures report significantly better outcomes. However,
once we add hospital-specific fixed effects the significance
of volume disappears. In general, regression results of the
effect of volume on clinical outcomes should be inter-
preted with caution due to potential endogeneity. The
presence of unobservable factors and potential reverse
causality in CABG markets where patients may search for
the health care provider based on quality may bias these
estimates. Two stage least squares (TSLS) results that cor-
rect for endogeneity show that although the relationship
between volume and excess mortality is positive, it is not
statistically significant. The key identifying variable was
the volume of other surgical procedures performed in the
hospital. We assume that the volume of other procedures
does not affect CABG mortality but does affect CABG vol-
ume. The instrument used (volume of other surgical pro-
cedures) is a significant predictor of CABG volume and
passed the Staiger-Stock test for weak instruments [28].
Although there is no significant correlation between vol-
ume of other surgical procedures and CABG outcomes,
the relationship may be indirect through hospital size.
Despite controlling for the size of the hospital a better
instrument may improve our understanding of the rela-
tionship between CABG volume and CABG outcomes.
The use of a weak instrument is one of the limitations of
this study.
Our TSLS results are consistent with findings by Ho
(2000) and Tsai et al. (2006) that show that over time, the
Table 2: Descriptive statistics for selected variables, 1997–2002 
(N = 373)
Variable Mean (st. deviation) Minimum Maximum
Outcome measures
Observed Mortality 3.15 (1.60) 0 12.1
Expected Mortality 2.93 (1.03) 0 6.89
Excess mortality 0.213 (1.37) -3.63 6.84
Market characteristics
Market HHI 0.0554 (0.185) 0.0143 0.169
CABG HHI 0.290 (0.225) 0.057 1
HMO penetration 0.512 (0.116) 0.043 0.724
Ownership status
County 0.535% (07.30)
District 7.23% (25.9)
Non-profit 81.3% (39.1)
Investor-owned 11.0% (31.3)
Hospital characteristics
Teaching 16.9% (37.5)
System affiliation 56.0% (49.7)
CABG volume 236.64 (197.40) 15 1531
Staffed beds 315.1 (153.63) 0 875
Per capita income 32.53 (9.21) 17.51 69.35
% Medicare 30.20 (16.76) 0 84.86
% Medi-Cal 12.71 (10.69) 0 59.31
Time variables
1997 13.7% (34.4)
1998 19.8% (39.9)
1999 17.4% (38.0)
2000 16.6% (37.3)
2001 16.6% (37.3)
2002 15.8% (36.5)
Table 3: Excess mortality-multivariate regression results, 1997–
2002
Variable Hospital Market CABG Market
Estimate (st. error) Estimate (st. error)
HHI 26.04*** (9.01) 3.07** (1.22)
HMO penetration 0.578 (0.706) 0.958 (0.752)
Non-profit 0.554 (0.477) 0.265 (0.373)
County -0.757 (1.11) -0.813 (1.07)
District -0.120 (0.888) -0.340 (0.582)
System 0.116 (0.156) 0.062 (0.152)
Teaching 0.409* (0.247) 0.390 (0.242)
Staffed beds -0.00104* (0.000617) -0.00107* (0.000607)
CABG Volume -0.00133*** (0.000354) -0.00146*** (0.000357)
Per capita income 0.0130 (0.00959) 0.00855 (0.00879)
% Medicare -0.0207** (0.00929) -0.0220** (0.00898)
% Medi-Cal 0.0310** (0.0121) 0.0267** (0.0107)
Non-profit*HHI -68.98*** (19.46) -3.78*** (0.973)
District*HHI -25.55** (12.59) -2.58** (1.24)
% Medicare*HHI 0.0916 (0.132) 0.0113 (0.0222)
% Medi-Cal*HHI -0.539** (0.250) -0.0702* (0.0385)
1997 0.107 (0.267) -0.00284 (0.263)
1998 -0.113 (0.243) -0.219 (0.241)
1999 -0.200 (0.247) -0.248 (0.245)
2000 0.0874 (0.237) 0.0527 (0.237)
2001 -0.510 (0.395) -0.601 (0.393)
Constant 0.0750 (0.806) 0.874 (0.716)
R-squared F 0.180 3.64*** 0.189 3.88***
Note: *P < 0.10, **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.01, Heteroskedasticity 
corrected standard errors are in parentheses.Page 5 of 8
(page number not for citation purposes)
BMC Health Services Research 2008, 8:89 http://www.biomedcentral.com/1472-6963/8/89disparity in outcomes between low- and high-volume
hospitals has narrowed [23,24]. More specifically, Welke
et al. (2005) found that hospital volume is not a discrim-
inator of mortality for CABG [29].
Other significant variables include interaction between
district ownership and competition; such hospitals have
lower excess mortality in more concentrated markets in all
specifications of the model. After hospital fixed effects
adjustment we find that the association between HMO
penetration and quality is negative (areas with higher pen-
etration had lower risk-adjusted mortality rates) but not
statistically significant. Thus, managed care does not sig-
nificantly decrease quality as is often hypothesized.
Sensitivity analyses
Mukamel, Dick and Spector (2000) show that even under
best case assumptions and perfect risk adjustment differ-
ent measures of risk-adjusted mortality outcomes may
lead to incorrect ordering of providers [30]. Our results
are robust to alternative specifications of the model. The
use of alternative measures of risk-adjusted CABG mortal-
ity, for example taking observed to expected mortality
ratios above 1.0 and the differences between hospital
observed to expected mortality ratios and this ratio for the
cohort did not change the main conclusions of this
research.
Measures of competition that are based on actual patient
flows (HSAs) may be endogenous due to higher quality
hospitals attracting more patients from far away areas.
Defining hospital market based on geographic bounda-
ries (counties) rather than patient flows (HSAs) did not
change our results concerning the impact of competition
with respect to excess mortality.
To check for potential omitted variable biases, HSA ran-
dom effects were added to the model in (1). Random
effects model also allows us to generalize our results to
markets beyond California. HSA random effects results
are consistent with those presented in Tables 3 and 4. The
coefficient on hospital market HHI is 22.79 with a p-value
of 0.025. In the CABG market the coefficient is smaller in
magnitude than what we observe in Tables 3 and 4
(0.0679) with a p-value of 0.093. Despite using California
data, our random effects results allow us to generalize
conclusions of this study to all markets: hospital competi-
tion has a positive and statistically significant effect on
patient outcomes.
Since hospital participation in the OSHPD survey did not
include all of the hospitals performing CABG (only 70%
of the CABG surgeries performed in California were repre-
sented) further adjustments were conducted for potential
hospital selection into the survey sample. Heckman
adjustment of selection into the sample did not change
the main conclusions of this research.
Discussion
Policy implications
The ability of competition in health care markets to con-
trol rising health care costs depends on its impact on
health care prices and patient outcomes. Currently the
impact of competition in health care markets is subject to
controversy due to the presence of non-profits in the
industry. The perception that non-profit hospitals are dif-
ferent from for-profits in their post-merger behavior is
based on Lynk (1995) [2]. In recent antitrust cases non-
profit hospitals often argue their exceptionality, citing
their non-profit mission and higher post-merger quality,
thus effectively preventing the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) from averting what it deems to be anticompetitive
mergers [31,32]. There are many theoretical models that
explain non-profit behavior, from physician's cooperative
at one extreme to identity with consumer cooperatives at
the other. Therefore, theoretically, price and quality
behavior of hospitals is ambiguous. Recent empirical reas-
sessments of Lynk's analysis show that a reduction in
competition leads to an increase in prices regardless of
ownership status [3,4,33]. Although the empirical evi-
Table 4: Excess mortality-fixed effects regression results, 1997–
2002
Variable Hospital Market CABG Market
Estimate (st. error) Estimate (st. error)
HHI 31.53** (15.51) 5.00*** (1.77)
HMO penetration -3.00 (2.04) -0.981 (2.27)
Non-profit -5.20* (2.65) 0.418 (0.851)
District -5.60* (2.95) 2.48 (1.53)
System -0.185 (0.309) -0.0167 (0.303)
Teaching 3.66*** (1.15) 0.244 (0.258)
Staffed beds -0.000849 (0.00161) -0.000609 (0.00154)
CABG Volume -0.000399 (0.00091) -0.0000602 (0.000900)
Income per capita 0.0133 (0.0251) -0.0292 (0.0262)
% Medicare -0.0137 (0.0116) -0.0232** (0.00943)
% Medi-Cal 0.00470 (0.0204) 0.0299*** (0.0111)
Non-profit*HHI -69.86*** (21.01) -4.33*** (1.04)
District*HHI -35.13** (17.34) -8.18*** (2.90)
% Medicare*HHI 0.139 (0.138) 0.0125 (0.0249)
% Medi-Cal*HHI -0.568** (0.283) -0.0786* (0.0438)
1997 0.287 (0.311) -0.202 (0.280)
1998 0.125 (0.347) -0.322 (0.249)
1999 -0.00694 (0.231) -0.351 (0.253)
2000 0.0846 (0.189 0.030 (0.235)
2001 -0.466 (0.462) -0.521 (0.414)
Constant 3.80 (2.70) 3.10** (1.42)
R-squared F 0.127 2.96*** 0.127 3.19***
Note: *P < 0.10, **P < 0.05, ***P < 0.01, Heteroskedasticity 
corrected standard errors are in parentheses.Page 6 of 8
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full impact of mergers on social welfare cannot be fully
understood enough without considering their impact on
quality. This study finds that competition has a signifi-
cantly positive effect on patient outcomes and leads to
lower risk-adjusted mortality rates. Similar results were
found in previous research addressing other measures of
quality [11,13,14]. Therefore, successful FTC challenges of
hospital mergers can potentially improve health care
quality. This study also finds that non-profit hospitals are
no different from their investor-owned counterparts
regarding the risk-adjusted CABG mortality rates. How-
ever, they tend to have better quality in more concentrated
markets than the for-profit hospitals. Thus, if mergers of
non-profit hospitals lead to higher prices and better qual-
ity relative to for-profits, the overall effect of such mergers
on social welfare is unclear. Finally, our results suggest
that the incentives for hospitals to reduce mortality rates
vary according to the method of reimbursement. There-
fore, both antitrust and Medicare and Medi-Cal policies
play a role in determining hospital quality. Higher com-
petition may benefit patients in aggregate but still harm
some subgroups. Increases in hospital market power, as
would occur following a merger, can lead to increases or
decreases in risk-adjusted hospital mortality and the effect
depends on hospital ownership as well as Medicare and
Medi-Cal penetration.
Limitations and avenues for future research
We have examined mortality measures for one specific
procedure, CABG surgery, and care must be taken when
extrapolating these results to other measures since hospi-
tals performing well in one clinical area do not necessarily
perform just as well in others [8,34]. Another limitation of
choosing CABG mortality rates is potential patient selec-
tion of health provider based on quality. The unmeasured
severity in markets where patients have an opportunity to
select their medical provider may lead to biased estimates.
Our analyses indicate that since OSHPD's public release
of hospital quality indicators, high-quality hospitals' mar-
ket share has not significantly changed. This may be due
to the fact that such adjustments take time (i.e. dissemi-
nating quality information to consumers may be associ-
ated with a time lag) or that consumers do not select
health care providers based on quality reports.
Results of this study rely on in-hospital risk-adjusted mor-
tality rates to measure quality. We need to remember that
although mortality is a critical outcome, it may not closely
reflect other important dimensions of quality such as
patient satisfaction, morbidity, or probability of readmis-
sions.
One further limitation bears mentioning. We use a sample
of California hospitals rather than a nationally represent-
ative sample. Thus, some of the relationships may not be
universal to other data, specifically those pertaining to the
effects of Medi-Cal insurance coverage.
This study analyzes only quality implications of hospital
competition. Adding the hospital-specific CABG costs,
charges and charges to costs ratios to the analysis would
determine more fully how hospital competition affects
social welfare.
Conclusion
Results of this study provide further evidence that quality
should be incorporated into the antitrust analysis. When
mergers lead to higher prices and lower quality, thus
lower social welfare, the antitrust challenge of hospital
mergers is warranted. Further, ownership may play a role
in hospitals' response to market power. Non-profit hospi-
tals tend to maintain better health care outcomes in the
absence of competitive pressures.
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